Abstract. This paper describes new methods for fast correlation attacks on stream ciphers, based on techniques used for constructing and decoding the by now famous turbo codes. The proposed algorithm consists of two parts, a preprocessing part and a decoding part. The preprocessing part identi es several parallel convolutional codes, embedded in the code generated by the LFSR, all sharing the same information bits. The decoding part then nds the correct information bits through an iterative decoding procedure. This provides the initial state of the LFSR.
Fig. 1. Principle of binary additive stream ciphers
cipher, a known-plaintext attack is equivalent to the problem of nding the key k that produced a given keystream z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z N . We hence assume that a given output sequence from the keystream generator z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z N is known to the cryptanalyst and that his task is to restore the secret key k.
In stream cipher design, it is common to use linear feedback shift registers, LFSRs, as building blocks in di erent ways. Furthermore, the secret key k is often chosen to be the initial state of the LFSRs.
Several classes of general cryptanalytic attacks against stream ciphers exist 13]. A very important, if not the most important, class of attacks on LFSR-based stream ciphers is correlation attacks. If one can, in some way, detect a correlation between the known output sequence and the output of one individual LFSR, it is possible to mount a divide-and-conquer attack on the individual LFSR 16, 17, 11, 12] . Observe that there is no requirement of structure of any kind for the key generator. The only requirement is the fact that, if u 1 , u 2 , . . . denotes the output of the particular LFSR, we have a correlation of the form P (u n = z n ) = 0.5, n ≥ 1. Other types of correlations may also apply.
A common methodology for producing random-like sequences from LFSRs is to combine the output of several LFSRs by a nonlinear Boolean function f with desired properties 13]. The purpose of f is to destroy the linearity of the LFSR sequences and hence provide the resulting sequence with a large linear complexity 13] . Note that for such a stream cipher, there is always a correlation between the output z n and either one or a set output symbols from di erent LFSRs.
Finding a low complexity algorithm that successfully can use the existing correlation in order to determine a part of the secret key can be a very e cient way of attacking stream ciphers for which a correlation is identi ed. After the initializing ideas of Siegenthaler 16, 17] , Meier and Sta elbach 11, 12] found a very interesting way to explore the correlation in what was called a fast correlation attack. A necessary condition is that the feedback polynomial of the LFSR has a very low weight. This work was followed by several papers, providing minor improvements to the initial results of Meier and Sta elbach, see 14, 3, 4, 15] . However, the algorithms demonstrate true e ciency (good performance and low complexity) only if the feedback polynomial is of low weight. Based on these attacks, it is a general advise that the generator polynomial should not be of low weight when constructing stream ciphers.
More recently, a step in another direction was taken, and it was suggested to use convolutional codes in order to improve performance 8]. More precisely, it was shown that one can identify an embedded low-rate convolutional code in the code generated by the LFSR sequences. This convolutional code can then be decoded using, e.g., the Viterbi algorithm, and a correctly decoded information sequence will provide the correct initial state of the LFSR.
The purpose of this paper is to describe new algorithms for fast correlation attacks. They are based on combining the iterative decoding techniques introduced by Meier and Sta elbach 11, 12] with the framework of embedded convolutional codes as suggested by the authors 8]. The proposed algorithm consists of two parts, a preprocessing part and a decoding part.
By considering permuted versions of the code generated by the LFSR sequences, several parallel embedded convolutional codes can be identi ed. They all share the same information sequence but have individual parity checks. This is the preprocessing part.
In the decoding part, the keystream z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z N is rst used to construct sequences acting as received sequences for the above convolutional codes. These sequences are then used to nd the correct information sequence by an iterative decoding procedure.
The code construction in the preprocessing part and the iterative decoding technique in the decoding part resemble very much the by now famous turbo codes and its decoding techniques 2]. Iterative decoding requires APP (a posteriori probability) decoding (also called MAP decoding), and for decoding convolutional codes one can use the famous BCJR algorithm 1], or preferably some modi cation of it 19, 5] .
For a xed memory size, the proposed algorithm provides a better performance than previous methods. As a particular example taken from 14], consider a LFSR of length 40 and an observed sequence of length 40000 bits. Let 1 − p be the correlation probability. Then for a certain memory size (B = 13), the best known algorithm 8] is successful up to p = 0.19, whereas the maximum p for the proposed algorithm lie in the range 0.20 − 0.27 when the number of parallel codes varies from one to 32. The price payed for increased performance is an increased computational complexity, but as argued in the paper, it is usually the available memory that limits the performance and not the computational complexity.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we give some preliminaries on the decoding model that is used for cryptanalysis, and in Section 3 and 4 we shortly review previous algorithms for fast correlation attacks. In Section 5 we present some of the new ideas in a basic algorithm using only one code. In Section 6 the use of several parallel codes is introduced and the complete algorithm is described. Simulation results are presented in Section 7. In Section 8 a parallelizable algorithm is proposed, and in Section 9 we conclude with some possible extensions.
As most other authors 17, 11, 12, 14, 3] , we use the approach of viewing our cryptanalysis problem as a decoding problem. An overview is given in Figure 2 . Let the LFSR have length l and let the set of possible LFSR sequences be denoted by L. Clearly, |L| = 2 l and for a xed length N the truncated sequences from L is also a linear [N, l] block code 10], referred to as C. Furthermore, the keystream sequence z = z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z N is regarded as the received channel output and the LFSR sequence u = u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u N is regarded as a codeword from the linear block code C.
Due to the correlation between u n and z n , we can describe each z n as the output of the binary symmetric channel, BSC, when u n was transmitted. The correlation probability 1 − p, de ned by 1 − p = P (u n = z n ), gives p as the crossover probability (error probability) in the BSC. W.l.o.g we assume p < 0.5. This is all shown in Figure 2 .
Fig. 2. Model for a correlation attack
The problem of cryptanalysis is now the following. Given the received word (z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z N ) as output of the BSC(p), nd the length N codeword from C that was transmitted.
It is known that the length N should be at least around N 0 = l/(1 − h(p)) for unique decoding 3], where h(p) is the binary entropy function. If the length N of the observed keystream sequence is small but allows unique decoding, the fastest methods for decoding are probabilistic decoding algorithms like Leon or Stern algorithms 9, 18].
We assume instead received sequences of large length, N >> N 0 . For this case, the fast correlation attacks 11, 12] are applicable. These attacks resemble very much the iterative decoding process proposed by Gallager 6] for low-weight parity-check codes. The drawback is the fact that the above attacks require the feedback polynomial g(x) (or any multiple of g(x) of modest degree) to have a low weight. Hence one usually refrain from using such feedback polynomials in stream cipher design.
3 Fast correlation attacks an overview In 11, 12] Meier and Sta elbach presented two algorithms, referred to as A and B, for fast correlation attacks. Instead of the exhaustive search as originally suggested in 17], the algorithms are based on using certain parity check equations created from the feedback polynomial of the LFSR.
In the rst pass, a set of suitable parity check equations in the code C is found. The second pass uses these parity check equations in a fast decoding algorithm to recover the transmitted codeword and hence the initial state of the LFSR.
Parity check equations in 11, 12] were created in two separate steps. Let
be the feedback polynomial, and t the number of taps of the LFSR, i.e., the weight of g(x) (the number of nonzero coe cients) is t + 1. Symbol number n of the LFSR sequence, u n , can then be written as u n = g 1 u n−1 + g 2 u n−2 + . . . + g l u n−l . Since the weight of g(x) is t + 1, there are the same number of relations involving a xed position u n . Hence, we get in this way t + 1 di erent parity check equations for u n . Secondly, using the fact that g(x)
, parity check equations are also generated by repeatedly squaring the polynomial g(x). The obtained parity check equations are then (essentially) valid in each index position of u.
The number of parity check equations, denoted m, that can be found in this way is m ≈ log( N 2l )(t + 1), where log uses base 2 11, 12] . In the second pass, we have m equations for position u n as,
. . .
where each b i is the sum of t di erent positions of u. Applying the above relations to the keystream we can introduce L i , ≤ i ≤ m, de ned as the following sums,
where y i is the sum of the positions in the keystream z corresponding to the positions in b i . Assume that h out of the m equations in (1) hold, i.e.,
The probability p * = P (u n = z n |h equations hold) is calculated as
where p = P (u n = z n ), and s = P (b i = y i ). This is used as an estimate of whether z n was correct or not. 
4.
If not all equations are satis ed go to step 1. This iterative approach is fundamental for our considerations, and we refer to 11, 12] for more details.
The algorithms above work well when the LFSR contains few taps, but for LFSRs with many taps the algorithms fail. The reason for this failure is that for LFSRs with many taps each parity check equation gives a very small average correction and hence many more equations are needed in order to succeed. Or in other words, the maximum correlation probability p that the algorithms can handle is much lower if the LFSR has many taps (≈ l/2). Minor improvements were suggested in, e.g., 14] and 3].
Fast correlation attacks based on convolutional codes
The general idea behind this algorithm, proposed recently in 8], is to consider slightly more advanced decoding algorithms including memory, but which still have a low decoding complexity. This allows weaker restrictions on the parity check equations that can be used, leading to many more and more powerful equations. The work in 8] then uses the Viterbi algorithm as its decoding algorithm in the decoding part.
We now review the basic results of 8]. The algorithm transforms a part of the code C stemming from the LFSR sequences into a convolutional code. The encoder of this convolutional code is created by nding suitable parity check equations from C. It is assumed that the reader is familiar with basic concepts regarding convolutional codes (see also 8]).
Let B be a xed memory size and let R denote the rate. In a convolutional encoder with memory B and rate R = 1/(m + 1) the vector v n of codeword symbols at time n,
is of the form
where each g i is a vector of length (m + 1). The task in the rst pass of the algorithm is to nd suitable parity check equations that will determine the vectors g i , 0 ≤ i ≤ m, de ning the convolutional code.
Let us start with the linear code C stemming from the LFSR sequences. There is a corresponding l × N generator matrix G LF SR , such that u = u 0 G LF SR , where u 0 is the initial state of the LFSR. The generator matrix is furthermore written in systematic form, i.e., G LF SR = I l Z , where I l is the l × l identity matrix.
We are now interested in nding parity check equations that involve a current symbol u n , and an arbitrary linear combination of the B previous symbols u n−1 , . . . , u n−B , together with at most t other symbols. Clearly, t should be small and in this description t = 2 is mainly considered.
To nd these equations, start by considering the index position n = B + 1. Introduce the following notation for the generator matrix,
Parity check equations for u B+1 with weight t outside the rst B + 1 positions can then be found by nding linear combinations of t columns of Z l−B−1 that adds to the all zero vector. For the case t = 2 the parity check equations can be found in a very simple way as follows. A parity check equation with t = 2 is found if two columns from G LF SR have the same value when restricted to the last l − B − 1 entries (the Z l−B−1 part). Hence, we simply put each column of Z l−B−1 into one of 2 l−B−1 di erent buckets , sorted according to the value of the last l−B −1 entries. Each pair of columns in each bucket will provide us with one parity check equation, provided u B+1 is included.
Assume that the above procedure gives us a set of m parity check equations for u B+1 , written as
It directly follows from the cyclic structure of the LFSR sequences that the same set of parity checks is valid for any index position n simply by shifting all the symbols in time, resulting in
is the sum of (at most) t positions in u.
Using the equations above one can create an R = 1 m+1 bi-in nite systematic convolutional encoder. Recall that the generator matrix for such a code is of the form
where the blank parts are regarded as zeros. Identifying the parity check equations from (6) with the description form of the convolutional code as in (7) gives
For each de ned codeword symbol v
n in the convolutional code one has an estimate of that symbol from the transmitted sequence z. If v
. Using these estimates one can construct a sequence r = . . . r 
To recover the initial state of the LFSR it is enough to decode l consecutive information bits correctly. Optimal decoding (ML decoding) of the convolutional code using the Viterbi algorithm can thus be performed.
The original Viterbi algorithm assumes that the convolutional encoder starts in state 0. However, in this application there is neither a starting state, nor an ending state for the trellis corresponding to the convolutional code. Hence, one runs the Viterbi algorithm over a number of dummy information symbols, placed before and after the l information symbols that one tries to decode correctly, see 8] . A suitable choice is to decode over J = l + 10B information symbols, where the l symbols in the middle are regarded as the l information bits that we want to estimate. The particular choice of J is based on heuristics for the decision distance of the decoding algorithm.
Some new ideas for fast correlation attacks
Two methods for decoding a noisy LFSR sequence have been described in Section 3 and 4. The Meier and Sta elbach Algorithm B calculates an a posteriori probability for each symbol of the complete received sequence and then iteratively tries to improve these probabilities by recalculating them. The procedure is based on very simple (memoryless) parity checks. The method of Section 4 uses instead convolutional codes but uses a simple Viterbi decoding procedure on a small part of the received sequence.
The ideas to be proposed try to combine the best parts of both methods into a single algorithm. The rst and basic construction uses one convolutional code (Section 4 method) and then applies an APP (a posteriori probability) decoding algorithm in order to provide an a posteriori probability for each symbol in a certain part of the received sequence. Optimal APP decoding (also referred to as MAP decoding) on a convolutional code can be performed by the famous BCJR algorithm 1], or variations of it. The a posteriori probabilities are then fed back as a priori probabilities and in this fashion the procedure is iterated until convergence. This is now described in more detail.
The rst step involves computing parity check equations for a convolutional code with xed memory B. We follow the procedure of Section 4 and compute all parity check equations with t = 2 involving the particular index position B + 1, as given by (5) . Parity checks for index position B + 1 + i are then immediately obtained through a cyclic shift of the original parity checks with i steps, as in (6) . We refer to Section 4 for a review of the details. Write the obtained parity check equations in the form
The convolutional code is de ned by all codeword sequences v,
Observe that the code is de ned only over the interval B + 1 ≤ n ≤ J. Since there are neither a starting state nor an ending state for the code trellis, we again decode over J − B > l information symbols. Following Section 4, we choose J = 10B + l as a starting point. Through simulations one can later adjust J to the most suitable value. Furthermore, the starting state, denoted s s , of the trellis (start value for the memory contents of the convolutional code) is given a probability distribution which is P (s s ) = P (u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u B ). The second step is the APP decoding phase. After receiving a sequence z, construct a sequence r acting as a received sequence for the convolutional code by r = . . . r 
Next, we transfer the a priori probabilities of u to the sequence v by
where P (u n = z n ) = 1 − p only in the rst iteration, and
Then decode the constructed sequence r stemming from a codeword v of the convolutional code using an APP decoding algorithm. The original BCJR algorithm requires storage of the whole trellis. However, suboptimal versions of the BCJR algorithm, see 19, 5] , remove this problem with a negligible decrease in performance. This procedure provides us with the a posteriori probabilities for the information sequence, i.e.,
. . this information is fed back as new a priori probabilities for (u B+1 , u B+2 , . . . , u J ) and the a priori probabilities of the codeword sequence v of the convolutional code is recalculated. The decoding procedure is performed a second time, and this procedure is iterated 2 − 5 times (until convergence).
Basic algorithm description:
Input The l × N generator matrix G LF SR for the code generated by a LFSR; the received sequence z; the error probability p; the number of iterations I. 1. (Precomputation) For each position n, B + 1 ≤ n ≤ J, in G LF SR , nd the set of parity check equations of the form (9) and construct the convolutional code. 2. (Decoding phase) After receiving z, construct the a priori probability vector (P (u B+1 ), P (u B+2 ), . . . , P (u J )) by P (u n = z n ) = 1 − p. Construct the received sequence r by
and the corresponding a priori probabilities for v n , B + 1 ≤ n ≤ J by
(Decoding phase) Update
Run the APP decoding algorithm with starting state distribution P (s s ) = P (u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u B ). Receive the a posteriori probabilities
4. If the number of iterations < I go to 3., otherwise select the most probable value for each of the symbols u 5B+1 , u 5B+2 , . . . , u 5B+l , calculate the initial state u 0 and check if it is correct. We end by presenting some simulation results for the basic algorithm. The obtained results are compared with the results in 11, 12, 14, 8] . We choose to use the same case as tabulated in 14, 8] , which is based on a LFSR with length l = 40, and a weight 17 feedback polynomial. Table 1 . Maximum p for some di erent algorithms when N = 40000 and B = 13, 14, 15.
Algorithms based on turbo code techniques
One of the most revolutionary ideas in coding theory the last decade has been the introduction of turbo codes. The original turbo code 2] consists of two convolutional codes, where the information bits are directly fed into one of them and an interleaved version of the same information bits are fed into the other convolutional code. The fundamentally new idea was the proposed decoding scheme, which uses an iterative procedure. Decode the rst code using an APP decoding algorithm which provides a posteriori probabilities for all information symbols. Use these as a priori information when decoding the second code using again APP decoding. The obtained a posteriori probabilities are now used as a priori information when decoding the rst code a second time, and the procedure continues in this iterative fashion. Much the same ideas as described above can be applied to our decoding problem. Instead of using just one xed convolutional code, as in the basic algorithm described in Section 5, we will show how to nd and use two or more di erent convolutional codes. These are obtained by randomly permuting the index positions of the original code in the interval B + 1 . . . J.
The a posteriori probability vector, which is the result of the decoding phase, from one code is fed as a priori information to the other code. This is viewed in Figure 3 . A problem arises, however, since we need parity check equations for permuted versions of the code C. The shifting technique will no longer provide this for all indices, since after the column permutation the new code has no longer the cyclic properties of C. To overcome this problem we simply search for all valid parity check equations in each index position. It will increase the precomputation time by a factor J − B, but for the case t = 2 this is not at all a problem. Hence, this procedure will create di erent parity check equations for di erent index positions, thus leading to a timevarying convolutional code (in opposite to the code in Section 5). Also the number of parity checks will vary with n. In order to nd the parity check equations for an index position n, where B + 1 ≤ n ≤ J, write the permuted generator matrix in the form
where Z 21 has length n−B−1 and Z 22 has length N −n. Then put each column of Z 22 together with its index position into one of 2 l−B−1 di erent buckets , sorted according to the column value. Each pair of columns in each bucket will provide us with one valid parity check equation (of the form (9)) for index position n, provided u n is included. Finally, since the number of parity checks will vary with n, we introduce m(n) as the number of found parity checks for index position n. The parity check equations for index position n is written as
For each n, the constants de ning the parity check equations,
must be stored in order to build the trellis in the decoding phase. After this precomputation phase, the decoding of the rst code follows the procedure of Section 5, but the resulting a posteriori probabilities are now fed as a priori information to the second decoder. The same procedure is repeated until all decoders have completed their task, and then the resulting a posteriori information is fed back to the rst decoder, starting the second iteration. After 2-5 iterations the decoding phase is completed. A comprehensive description of the procedure for M constituent codes/decoders follows.
Turbo algorithm description:
Input The l × N generator matrix G LF SR for the code generated by the LFSR; the received sequence z; the error probability p; the number of iterations I; the number of constituent codes M . 1. (Precomputation) Let π 2 , . . . , π M be M − 1 random permutations permuting indices B + 1, . . . , J and leaving the other indices xed. Let
Then nd all parity checks of the form (13) for each
(Decoding phase) After receiving z, construct the a priori probability vector
For each G i , construct the received sequence r by
(Decoding phase) For
Run the MAP algorithm on G i with starting state distribution P (s s ) = P (u 1 , u 2 , . . . u B ). Receive the a posteriori probabilities
Let i ← i + 1 and if i = M + 1 then i ← 1. 4. If the number of iterations < I·M go to 3., otherwise select the most probable value for each of the symbols u 5B+1 , u 5B+2 , . . . , u 5B+l , calculate the initial state u 0 and check it for correctness.
7 Performance of the turbo algorithm
In this section we present some simulation results for the turbo algorithm. The parameter values are J = 10B + l and I = 3. In Table 2 we show the maximum error probability for a received sequence of length N = 40000 when the memory B is varying in the range 10 − 13 and the number of constituent codes is 1, 2, 4, 8 and 16. Table 3 then shows the same for length N = 400000. Table 2 . Table 3 . Maximum p for turbo algorithm with B = 10, . . . , 13 and varying M when N = 400000.
We can see the performance improvement with growing M for xed B. A few comments regarding computational complexity and memory requirements are in place.
If one uses the suboptimal APP decoding algorithm in 19] the memory requirements will be roughly the same as in Viterbi decoding. The computational complexity for the algorithm in 19] is roughly a factor 3 higher compared to the Viterbi algorithm, since it runs through the trellis three times. There are also slightly di erent operations performed in the algorithms. The computational complexity is then further increased a factor M when the turbo algorithm with M constituent codes are considered. Finally, we iterate at least twice. To conclude, for xed parameters B and N , the turbo algorithm have roughly the same memory requirements, but an increase of computational complexity of at least a factor 6M .
It is important to note that in many cases, the possible performance is not limited by the computational complexity, but rather, limited by the required memory. For example, if N = 40000, the maximal memory size that our current implementation could handle for the basic algorithm on a regular PC (for the example given in Table 2 ) was B = 17, but this required only roughly half an hour CPU time. Hence, in this case we do not consider the penalty of increased computational complexity to be severe. 8 A parallel version of the turbo algorithm As can be seen from the description of the turbo algorithm, it is not directly parallelizable (the APP decoding can be partly parallelized). Since it is very reasonable to assume that the opponent can compute in parallel, we shortly describe a modi ed turbo algorithm. Assume that the opponent has access to M di erent processors. He then constructs M di erent constituent convolutional codes exactly as described in Section 6 using some suitable memory B. After having received the keystream z, the received sequences r are constructed and the a priori probabilities are calculated. Next, processor number i works as the APP decoder for code number i, with the a priori probabilities as input. Observe that all the decoders work on the same input. Each decoder then outputs an a posteriori probability vector.
For each position n, an overall a posteriori probability for that position, P (u n = z n ) is calculated. Let P i (u n = z n |r) be the a posteriori probability stemming from code i. Then the overall a posteriori probability for this algorithm is given by
The probability vector is then fed back as a priori information, and the same process is repeated again. The structure is depicted in Figure 4 . The performance is slightly worse than the turbo algorithm. Some simulation result for N = 40000 are given in Table 4 .
Conclusions
In this work we have shown how iterative decoding techniques based on the ideas from the construction and decoding of turbo codes can be used as a basis for Table 4 . Maximum p for the parallel turbo algorithm when N = 40000 and B = 13.
correlation attacks on stream ciphers. The performance has been demonstrated through simulations. Still, many possible variations of the proposed type of fast correlation attacks exist, that need to be examined. The proposed iterative decoding techniques have opened for other possibilities that can be considered in the future. We mention two possible extensions.
• Reduced complexity decoding. As noted in this work, the main performance limit for the proposed decoding algorithms as well as for 8] is the memory requirement. A possible way to overcome this problem is to consider suboptimal decoding algorithms with reduced memory. Examples of such are list decoding and di erent sequential decoding algorithms 7].
• Other iterative decoding structures. An alternative to the decoding structure in this work, as given in Figure 3 , could be the following. Consider all index positions that are used to build parity check equations for the convolutional code. Now consider these positions as information symbols for another convolutional code, and nd parity checks for this code. Decoding this code will provide APP probabilities for its information symbols and hence more reliable parity checks for the rst code. This idea is easily generalized to more complex decoding structures.
